۱۹۸۲ء دی جنگ لبنان

1982 Lebanon War
	بسلسلہ the Palestinian insurgency in South Lebanon (Israeli–Palestinian conflict) and Lebanese Civil War
	; Lebanese troops in Beirut, 1982
تاریخ	6 June 1982 – June 1985; (main phase June–September 1982)
مقام	Southern لبنان
نتیجہ	Israeli strategic failure; Syrian political advantage PLO expulsion from Lebanon; Collapse of Maronite-Israeli alliance, failure to achieve Lebanese-Israeli peace; Increased Syrian influence in Lebanon; Continued conflict between Israel & SLA vs حزب اللہ over South Lebanon;
سرحدی; تبدیلیاں	Self-proclaimed Free Lebanon State slowly transforms into South Lebanon Security Zone
محارب
اسرائیل; Lebanese Front Phalange; al-Tanzim; Free Lebanon State	PLO; شام; Jammoul; حزب اللہ; Amal; Al-Mourabitoun And others... Islamic Amal ; ASALA ; Al-Tawhid ; PKK ;
کمانڈر اور رہنما
Israel:; مناخم بیگن ; (Prime Minister); آرئیل شارون; (Ministry of Defence); Rafael Eitan ; (Army Chief of Staff); David Ivry; (Israeli Air Force); Ze'ev Almog; (Israeli Sea Corps)Phalange:; Bachir Gemayel ; Fadi Frem ; Elie Hobeika Al-Tanzim: ; Fawzi MahfuzSLA:; Saad Haddad	PLO:; یاسر عرفات; (Chairman of the PLO)Syria:; حافظ الاسد; (President); Mustafa Tlass; (Minister of Defense)LCP:; George Hawi ; Elias AtallahHezbollah:; Abbas al-MusawiAl-Mourabitoun:; Ibrahim KulaylatAmal:; Nabih BerriASALA:; Monte MelkonianPKK:; Mahsum KorkmazOthers: ; Muhsin Ibrahim ; Abbas al-Musawi; Ragheb Harb; Murat Karayılan; Inaam Raad; Said Shaaban
طاقت
Israel:; 78,000 troops; 800 tanks; 1,500 APCs; 634 aircraft; LF:; 30,000 troops; SLA:; 5,000 troops; 97 tanks	Syria:; 22,000 troops; 352 tanks; 300 APCs; 450 aircraft; 300 artillery pieces; 100 anti-aircraft guns; 125 SAM batteries; PLO:; 15,000 troops; 80 tanks; 150 APCs; 350+ artillery pieces; 250+ anti-aircraft guns
ہلاکتیں اور نقصانات
Israel: 657 dead, 3,887 wounded	Syrian & Palestinian combatants:; See Casualties below.
	Civilians: See Casualties below.

جنگ لبنان 1982 تو‏ں مراد لبنان اُتے اسرائیلی حملے نو‏‏ں کہیا جاندا اے جو 6 جون 1982ء نو‏‏ں شروع ہويا جدو‏ں اسرائیل نے جنوبی لبنان تو‏ں حملہ کیتا۔ جس دا مقصد ابو ندال نامی تنظیم دے خلاف قدم اٹھانا سی ۔

حوالے

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↑ The Lebanon War: Operation Peace for Galilee (1982), Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved 4 February 2014.
↑ Globalsecurity.org, THE ISRAELI EXPERIENCE IN LEBANON, 1982–1985, Major George C. Solley, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 10 May 1987. Retrieved 7 February 2014.
"The third goal was to remove Syrian presence from Lebanon. The recognition that this goal was obviously unsuccessful must betempered by an awareness of the Lebanese situation since 1982. Even when the first two aims seemed to have been met, Syrian recalcitrance acted as a stumbling blocks the Syrians would by nomeans agree to a withdrawal from Lebanon in conjunction with the Israelis and therefore were able to effectively scuttle the 17 May, Agreement between Israel and Lebanon before it had any chance of fulfillment; Syria offered a haven for PLO fighters in the Bekaa Valley from which they could stage raids on the IDF in Lebanon and from which many have now moved back into Beirut and Sidon; and despite having taken severe losses during the June fighting, Syria was able to quickly replace those losses with better Soviet equipment accompanied by a number of Soviet advisors."
↑ Hirst, David (2010). Beware of Small States. NationBooks, 144–145. ISBN 978-1-56858-657-1. “In time, however, Arafat and his guerrilla leadership decided that they would have to withdraw, leaving no military and very little political or symbolic presence behind. Their enemy's firepower and overall strategic advantage were too great and it was apparently ready to use them to destroy the whole city over the heads of its inhabitants. The rank and file did not like this decision, and there were murmurings of 'treason' from some of Arafat's harsher critics. Had they not already held out, far longer than any Arab country in any former war, against all that the most powerful army in the Middle East – and the fourth most powerful in the world, according to Sharon – could throw against them? (…) But [Palestinians] knew that, if they expected too much, they could easily lose [Lebanense Muslim support] again. 'If this had been Jerusalem', they said, 'we would have stayed to the end. But Beirut is not outs to destroy.”
↑ Morris, p. 559
↑ Wars, Internal Conflicts, and Political Order: A Jewish Democracy in the Middle East, Gad Barzilai, pp. 148

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[4] The Lebanon War: Operation Peace for Galilee (1982), Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved 4 February 2014.

[5] Globalsecurity.org, THE ISRAELI EXPERIENCE IN LEBANON, 1982–1985, Major George C. Solley, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 10 May 1987. Retrieved 7 February 2014.
"The third goal was to remove Syrian presence from Lebanon. The recognition that this goal was obviously unsuccessful must betempered by an awareness of the Lebanese situation since 1982. Even when the first two aims seemed to have been met, Syrian recalcitrance acted as a stumbling blocks the Syrians would by nomeans agree to a withdrawal from Lebanon in conjunction with the Israelis and therefore were able to effectively scuttle the 17 May, Agreement between Israel and Lebanon before it had any chance of fulfillment; Syria offered a haven for PLO fighters in the Bekaa Valley from which they could stage raids on the IDF in Lebanon and from which many have now moved back into Beirut and Sidon; and despite having taken severe losses during the June fighting, Syria was able to quickly replace those losses with better Soviet equipment accompanied by a number of Soviet advisors."

[6] Hirst, David (2010). Beware of Small States. NationBooks, 144–145. ISBN 978-1-56858-657-1. “In time, however, Arafat and his guerrilla leadership decided that they would have to withdraw, leaving no military and very little political or symbolic presence behind. Their enemy's firepower and overall strategic advantage were too great and it was apparently ready to use them to destroy the whole city over the heads of its inhabitants. The rank and file did not like this decision, and there were murmurings of 'treason' from some of Arafat's harsher critics. Had they not already held out, far longer than any Arab country in any former war, against all that the most powerful army in the Middle East – and the fourth most powerful in the world, according to Sharon – could throw against them? (…) But [Palestinians] knew that, if they expected too much, they could easily lose [Lebanense Muslim support] again. 'If this had been Jerusalem', they said, 'we would have stayed to the end. But Beirut is not outs to destroy.”

[Morris-7] Morris, p. 559

[books.google.no-8] Wars, Internal Conflicts, and Political Order: A Jewish Democracy in the Middle East, Gad Barzilai, pp. 148

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